� 1930 Clark University Press.
I. WORK IN COMMERCIAL HIGH SCHOOLS AND PRACTICAL ATTITUDE
The reason why I am only now responding to the very friendly and complimentary request which came a few years ago from Professor Carl Murchison, that I write my biography for this collection, lies in the fact that precisely in the last few years I have been carrying a particularly heavy load of work, from which I am only now beginning to recover somewhat.� In addition to conducting my scientific work and my professorship at W�rzburg I taught for five and one-half years (up to October 1, 1931) in the Commercial High School in N�rnberg (High School for Social and Industrial Science) where, as in W�rzburg, I represented the subjects of psychology, pedagogy, and philosophy, also belonging to the Senate of the high school.� In N�rnberg I was furthermore in charge of the Psychological Institute of the Commercial High School.
Although the N�rnberg position became more and more exacting, I enjoyed my work in it.� Although in general a university can certainly give a psychologist and philosopher much more stimulation than a commercial high school can, yet my working in such a high school did have certain special advantages for me.
Immediately after the War I had begun to be interested in the psychology of advertising, which arose in the United States and which, like industrial psychology as a whole, was first made known in my country by Hugo M�nsterberg.� Already in 1924 there appeared a book on the psychology of advertising by Theodor K�nig, then one of my students, which, as the first German book on this subject, had a large circulation, went through three editions, and had been written originally as a doctor's thesis in my W�rzburg Institute. Already in the year 1925 I had written for the journal, Die Reklame, an article entitled "Die psychologische Beratung bei der Reklame," and before and after this I had been called upon many times by the most varied concerns for expert opinion in the field of advertising.� I had been interested from the start in the aptitude tests from America.� And even before the War I had [p. 182] been concerned with the practical significance and utilization of psychology.� My essay, "Theorie der kinematographischen Projektionen" (Leipzig, 1910), already aimed at a practical application of psychology.� As long ago as 1912, at the Fifth Congress of the German Society for Psychology, in Berlin, I presented an extensive summary of discussions of the significance of psychology for the other sciences and in practical life.
It is plain that this practical attitude of mine, which revealed itself in the above-mentioned activities and also in many other writings, some of which are to be mentioned later, necessarily made work in a commercial high school appear desirable.� Also, there were many fields of industrial psychology�as, for instance, the question of aptitude for being a merchant and of the psychological analysis of industrial markets�in which, inevitably, commercial high schools were more interested than universities.� In N�rnberg I worked particularly on the psychology of advertising, often lecturing there in conjunction with the Professor of Industrial Management, Dr. Alfred Isaac Kurse, on the psychology and technique of advertising.
It is also quite plain, however, that all my efforts in the field of industrial psychology were necessarily much deepened by association with my N�rnberg colleagues. While my book, Psychologie der Werbung (Stuttgart, 1927), was still written primarily during a time when I was not working In N�rnberg, my work on the Psychologie der Wertreklame and two essays on the psychology of command and obedience come within my N�rnberg period.
Furthermore, I had already worked once before for a time in a commercial high school, namely, while I was at the Akademie f�r Sozial- und Handelswissenschaften in Frankfort a. Main, where I taught from 1905 to 1910.� During the first semester of 1909-1910 I worked simultaneously in Frankfort and as regular Professor at the University of W�rzburg, where, even before moving to Frankfort, I had been for nine years, first as a Privatdozent, then as an externe professor, and finally as Vice-President of the Psychological Institute and for a year also as the official representative for pedagogy.
In my time the Frankfurter Akademie was at the same time a commercial high school, and even today, although it has become a university, it still counts the tasks of a commercial high school among [p. 183] its most important functions.� My interest in questions of industrial science had already been aroused in Frankfort, although of course industrial psychology did not exist at that time.
The practical attitude which I have mentioned showed itself also in the invention, development, and application of my "Russmethode" (method using smoke of flame for direct recording of voice), to which I devoted a considerable number of articles in the Physikalische Zeitschrift, the Zeitschrift f�r Psychologie, and other journals, and which falls within my Frankfort period, although this invention itself originated in purely theoretical considerations. During my earliest activity in W�rzburg I had been interested, among other things, in the psychology of language.� This interest was perhaps particularly stimulated by a friend who died all too young, the well-known linguist, Albert Thumb, with whom I had published, in Leipzig in 1901, the essay, "Experimentelle Untersuchungen �ber die psychologischen Grundlagen der sprachlichen Analogiebildung."� Later I had published my work, Ueber den Rhythmus der Prosa (Giessen, 1907), in which I was able to show, among other things, that the aesthetic impression of a prose work depends essentially upon the rhythm of the work, that this rhythm is different in different works and authors, etc. It seemed a logical step to me then to subject the melody of speech to experiments similar to those relating to dynamic rhythm and to find a technique which suited me for the graphic registration of the melody of speech. In this way I came upon the generally known "Russmethode," which I at once had Eggert, my student at the time, apply to the melody of speech (Zeitschrift f�r 1908, 49, 218-237), and which later led Thom and me to the plan of investigating the melody of dialects by this "soot method"�a plan which was, of course, frustrated by Thom's death (1915).
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I also treated the "soot method" from the theoretical point of view (cf. Marbe, K. and Seddig, M.: Untersuchungen schwingender Flammen.� Annalen der Physik, 1909, 30, Series 4, pp. 579 ff.), and it has also been applied to phonetics.� Its invention likewise led me to the most varied practical applications, which were far remote from the field of language.� Thus I have shown that it can also be applied to the graphic registration of heart sounds and pathological heart noises, a fact which lead to the book, Klinische Untersuchungen �ber die Schallerscheinungen des Herzens (Leipzig, 1911), by my friend the internist Ernst Roos, who, alas, has also died.
[p. 184] Further testimony to my practical attitude is borne by my articles, "Ueber Psychologie und Eisenbahnwesen" (Archiv f�r Eisenbahnwesen, 1924, pp. 729 ff.), "Psychologie und Versicherungswesen" (Zeitschrift f�r die gesammte Versicherungswissenschaft, 1925, 25, 337 ff.), and "Ueber Strafanstalt und Psychologie" (Zeitschrift f�r Psychologie, 1926, 99, 375-382).� Evidence of this attitude is also given by my actual psychotechnical investigations, such as, for example, the one on aptitude for surgery and dentistry (Deutsche Zeitschrift f�r Chirurgie, 1928, 208, 289-317; Deutsche Zahn�rztliche Wochenschrift, 1928, 31, No.6) and also my little essay on "Psychotechnische und faktische Eignung" (Industrielle Psychotechnik, 1928, 5, 16-20).� This attitude likewise explains my wish, which, is continually being reactivated, to obtain practical recognition and practical significance for psychology as extensively as possible in the most varied fields of life and science.
Perhaps my largest accomplishment in this respect has been attained through my effort to bring psychology and jurisprudence into closer contact with each other.� The first German psychological legal expert opinion was my testimony in a case of sexual assault in W�rzburg in 1911, in which I had to discuss the question of the testimony of children.� Soon afterwards came my testimony in the suit resulting from the big railroad accident at M�llheim in Baden, which was argued before the Provincial Court of Freiburg i. Br.� At that time I was able to utilize not only the psychology of alcohol but also, and especially, the theory of reaction times, which has been brought up so many times since, and must be brought up, in the psychology of accidents.� This case was argued in 1912.� Since that time, through my agency and that of others, a mass of psychological expert testimony has been submitted, bearing continually upon new circumstances.� Thus, for example, in 1930, as an expert witness in a case in Elberfelde, I was able to treat experimentally, among other matters, the question of whether or not certain impostures and deceptions are possible.
My successful activity in the railroad case which I have mentioned, which led to many other similar juridical activities on my part, I owe, incidentally, to pure chance. The district attorney in the case of the M�llheim railroad accident, who is now Reichsgerichtsrat Justus Bender, is one of my friends.� When I heard of the accident I addressed myself to him personally and pointed out [p. 185] that psychology was in a good position for explaining much in this connection; I was then named as the medical expert in this case.
My first general publication on legal psychology was my Grundz�ge der forensichen Psychologie (M�nchen, 1913); my most recent work in this field is my little book on the Halsmann case (Leipzig, 1932), in which I discussed in detail the essential significance of the psychological expert, of which I had already frequently spoken.� In my work, Der Psycholog als Gerichtsgutachter im Strafund Zivilprozess (Stuttgart, 1926), I presented a survey of the legal activity of psychologists to date.
I attach particular value to my work on the psychology of accidents, to which I have devoted several essays. This work is perhaps best known through my little book, Praktische Psychologie der Unf�lle und Betriebssch�den (Munich and Berlin, 1926), and again reveals my practical point of view.� On the basis of the data of a large insurance company I was able to show that the probability that a given person will have an accident varies directly with the number of accidents he has already had within a given time.� Furthermore, on the basis of data from the German railways I was able to show that the probability that a given workman will cause damage will likewise vary directly with the number of times he has already caused damage within a certain period of time in the past.� It was also possible to show that those people who frequently suffer accidents are the same ones who repeatedly cause them.� Psychological analyses and experiments showed that the psychological prerequisites for the causation of damage and for special liability to accident are, on the whole, one and the same.� These facts led me to the concept of the "Unf�ller" ("accidenter") and to the recognition of the deep significance of the psychology of personality in the avoidance of industrial damage and accidents of all kinds.
Naturally, however, in my book on accidents, the psychology of personality in general also had to be discussed.� I had already devoted attention to this subject in my essay in the Festschrift f�r Robert Sommer in the year 1925 (Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 1925, 94, pp. 359 ff.) and later treated it again and again, as in my detailed review, "Pers�nlichkeit und Aussage," given at a congress of the Kriminalbiologische Gesellschaft in Munich (Mitteilungen der Kriminalbiologischen Gesellschaft, 1931, 3, pp. 89 ff.) I attach particular value to the concept of the momentary personality [p. 186] (momentane Pers�nlichkeit) and to the fact that, in spite of the great significance of the congenital factor and of the deeper levels of personality, the individual is nevertheless a different person as it were, each moment.� The theory of modifiability (Umstellbarkeit), which is of great practical significance, which can be treated experimentally, and which is of importance to the psychology of accidents, among other subjects, my associates and I have discussed again and again.� Individuals vary very widely in their ability to adapt themselves to new situations.� To many people repeated adjustment of the personality seems desirable and pleasant.� To others it is unbearable.� I reckon among the more important results of my researches the establishment of the theory of modification (Umstellung), which I was able to use, among other places, in an article on homesickness (Archiv f�r die gesamte Psychologie, 1925, 50, 512-524).
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My practical attitude is again shown in my pamphlet, "Eignungspr�fungen fur Ruteng�nger (Munich, 1927), and also found expression in the invention of various pieces of apparatus and series of experiments, of which my apparatus for shifting sectors (Sektorenverschiebungsapparat) has probably come to be best known.� This apparatus, which I invented as a young physician during my stay in the Leipziger Institut of Wilhelm Wundt, and which I discussed in 1894 in the Zentralblatt f�r Psychologie, Volume 25, pp. 811 ff., makes it possible to change the sectors of a rotating disc during the rotation.� I had heard that the Physikalisch-technische Reichsanstalt in Berlin was working on the solution to this problem, so I plunged into the question and completed my apparatus and published it considerably sooner than the Reichsanstalt finished its efforts. Today both sets of apparatus, which, incidentally, are based upon quite different principles, are widely used.
Always, however, my practical efforts have been closely related to my interests bearing on theoretical psychology.� This connection, to my mind, is necessary.� "The psychologist who stops his studies when they lead him to practical attitudes and practical measures incurs the just reproach of narrow-mindedness.� But one who aims only at practical results lapses into a wretched technicalistic psychology (Laboranten psychologie)." This was approximately what I said at the Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft f�r Psychologie (at [p. 187] that time the Gesellschaft f�r experimentelle Psychologie) in Munich (1925), amid the general approval of my auditors.
II. BASIC ATTITUDE ON PURE THEORY. STUDENT PERIOD.
ENTRANCE INTO THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WURZBURG
The practical attitude which I have strongly emphasized so far, and which, of course, was associated with pleasure in practical results, developed very slowly in me and at present seems to be receding again. When, at the age of 18, I passed my matriculation examination in my native city of Freiburg i. Br. and then served there as a volunteer for one year, during which I was registered as a student but could not study, my orientation was at first a purely theoretical one.� Pure science was my ideal.� At that time all practical activity seemed to me inferior.� At first I had intended to study Germanistics and modern German literature, and during my first semester in Freiburg after my period of military service I attended lectures primarily in philology, literature, and philosophy.� At that time I was interested particularly in Old Norse, Middle High German, and Sanskrit.� I was introduced to philosophy by the famous philosopher, Alois Riehl, who was then teaching in Freiburg and with whom I had a two-hour seminar on basic philosophies of life.� With the newer psychology, then only little known in general circles, I was occupied only incidentally in that I made the personal acquaintance of Hugo M�nsterberg, who was at that time active as a Privatdozent in Freiburg, and also attended his one-hour lecture course on hypnotism.� Incidentally, it was something quite new to have university lectures on this subject, and M�nsterberg was probably one of the first to lecture on hypnosis in an institution for higher education.
Toward the end of my student period in Freiburg I asked my instructor in Germanistics, the philologist, Hermann Paul, who was also then working in Freiburg and who later became very famous, where I ought to go to continue my studies, as I had no desire to go on studying at home indefinitely.� Paul advised me quite decidedly to go to Halle, where the professorship in Germanistics was held by Sievers, whom he esteemed very highly and who later became known to the psychologists through his investigations (to my mind entirely erroneous), or rather his assertions, on the psychology of language and of music.
[p. 188] Sievers and his students taught that every author is characterized by a special voice quality (Stimmqualit�t) and that absolutely every work created by man in the field of sound, whether language or music, is dominated by certain sound constants (klangliche Konstanten) which are of basic importance in the character and effect of the sound product (Klangwerk) and show large individual variations.� Sievers claimed that it was possible, on the basis of difference in voice quality alone, to decide whether a given piece of prose or poetry was to be ascribed to one author or two different authors.� Never, however, did Sievers conduct real experiments with which he might support this theory, which at first found many adherents but then decidedly lost in interest.� At the Kongress f�r Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft in Berlin in 1914 I first made Sievers' acquaintance.� Not only I but also the Berlin psychologist, Carl Stumpf, and others opposed his theory at that time.
I did not follow Paul's suggestion that I transfer my studies to Halle.� I wanted not only to study but also to enjoy the world and life, and therefore, at the end of April, 1890, I went for one semester to Bonn, which had been described to me as one of the loveliest of the German university towns.� Here I continued my studies in philology, but also came in touch with G�tz Martius, a student of Wundt's, who was a Privatdozent at Bonn at that time and who had been mentioned to me by M�nsterberg.� At that time Martius was making all sorts of reaction experiments, in which I helped him and which increased my interest in modern psychology.� I also attended his seminar on Spinoza, which deepened my philosophical interests.� I also began at that time to read other philosophical classics besides Spinoza, and I continued this reading during the subsequent vacation and during my whole student period.
During the following Winter Semester, 1890-1891, I studied in Berlin, having meanwhile decided to become not a germanicist or a literary historian but a philosopher.� I still remember quite definitely that, upon my arrival in Berlin, I wrote to a friend that I had now decided to devote myself entirely to philosophy, which had always interested me. How I came to this decision, however, is hard to state in a few words.� Certainly I did not make it in the course of a few days or weeks. Rather it undoubtedly matured quite gradually.� At that time I considered myself a young man who was rich or at least very well-to-do, and in a certain sense I really was.� [p. 189] For being rich consists not in having an income of $30,000 or more but in having an income which exceeds one's needs.� At that time not a soul dreamed of the losses of income which we Germans were to incur as a result of the War and inflation. And the thought that I would ever have to or wish to live on the income of a professor was quite foreign to me. The reason why I turned first to the study of philology and literature lay in the fact that one of my teachers at the Gymnasium at Freiburg had especially aroused my enthusiasm for these things.� Philosophy, in which another teacher had interested me, I had regarded only as absolutely necessary to the intensive study of literature. It gradually interested me more and more, however, and all other scientific interests receded proportionately into the background.� Thus my subsequent intention of becoming a philosopher did not represent a real transfer to another field, but rather only a gradual redirection of my interests.� Also, when I came to Berlin, I naturally was not thinking of choosing psychology as my special subject.� At that time in Germany there was probably no one who held the view, which I stressed strongly later on, especially at the Congress of Psychologists in Marburg in 1921, that psychology should be separated from philosophy as a distinct field.� And when, in Berlin as previously in Freiburg and Bonn, I did do some work in the new psychology, which at that time we called experimental or even physiological psychology, I did this only because, in my opinion, this, too, belonged to philosophy.
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My Berlin psychological studies were conducted under the guidance of Hermann Ebbinghaus, who was at that time Professor Extraordinary in Berlin.� I studied philosophy under the famous historian of ancient philosophy, Eduard Zeller. I also attended additional lectures, in part regularly and in part as an auditor, in order to further my general culture, which I regarded from the first as fundamental for a philosopher.
In the summer of 1881 I returned to Bonn, where I studied mainly with the three regular professors of philosophy, the Kantian J�rgen Bona Meyer, J. Neuh�user, the authority on Aristotle, and Wilhelm Bender.� Bender was an evangelical theologian who had been moved out of the evangelical-theological into the philosophical faculty because of his very advanced views. Through Neuh�user, who, incidentally, was a scholasticist and thoroughly clerical in his orientation, [p. 190] and through student friends of mine in the field of classical philology I was stimulated to extend my philosophical reading to ancient philosophy and to do it more in the original.� I cannot say that, except in this one respect, I received very much stimulation from the three teachers named above.� It would be more accurate if I said that the fact that I did not allow them to frighten me away from the study of philosophy shows that my interest in philosophy was very active at that time.
At that same time in Bonn I also attended the big laboratory course in physics under Heinrich Hertz, the discoverer of the electric wave, and his assistant at that time, Philipp Lenard, later the famous Heidelberger physicist, while I frequently used my vacations, which I usually spent in Freiburg, to work in a private chemistry laboratory there.� In Bonn I also attended the lectures in physics and chemistry by Hertz and Kekul�.� It was thus not until this second Bonn period, which lasted up to the time of my doctorate examination (1893), that I began to study the natural sciences.
During this period I again worked with Martius, under whose guidance I had, as a student, already written an article on the fluctuations in visual sensations (Philosophische Studien, 1893, 8, 615-637) and in whose private institute I also wrote my doctor's thesis, "Zur Lehre von Gesichtsempfindungen, welche aus successiven Reizen resultieren" (Philosophische Studien, 1894, 9, pp. 384 ff.).
The article on the fluctuations of visual sensations bore upon a problem treated several times by students of Wundt under the head of fluctuations of attention.� I was able to show experimentally that these fluctuations are not really fluctuations of attention, but rather fluctuations in sensation.� That a philosopher should hand in as his dissertation an experimental study of successive stimuli and visual sensations at that time caused some surprise and shaking of heads.� It did not do me any harm, or at least not much, in connection with my receiving the degree, for I received it with the designation "insigni cum laude," not frequently given in Bonn at that time.� I was examined for an hour each by J�rgen Bona Meyer and Neuh�user in philosophy.� Just before this examination I had to take the Magisterexamen (master's examination) in mathematics, natural sciences, history, and classical philology, each for one-half hour.� This utterly senseless Bonn arrangement, which kept many [p. 191] people from taking their degrees in Bonn, and by which of course any half-way thorough knowledge of the subjects was not to be expected, has meanwhile been quite abolished.� In classical philology I was examined by the famous philologist, B�cheler, who put before me the Ethics of Aristotle, which I was easily able to master, as I had read more difficult writings of Aristotle.
Perhaps I would have handed in, in Bonn, not an experimental but a purely philosophical piece of work as a dissertation if I had been more strongly attracted to the teaching of the three regular professors of philosophy mentioned above.� Perhaps I might not have remained in Bonn at all if I had not been held by certain personal relationships to which I will revert further on.
During my second stay in Bonn I also studied more closely the writings of W. Wundt, to whose Grundz�ge der physiologischen Psychologie my attention had already been directed by M�nsterberg in Freiburg.� Wundt's combination of medical and specifically physiological, psychological, and general philosophical interests, and his great literary productivity impressed me tremendously at the time.� I read many other modern philosophical authors also during my student period in Bonn.� It was always, however, the association of universality with specific scientific achievement which I valued particularly then.� A comprehensive view over the whole realm of science and considerable positive research and achievement in special fields seemed to me to be the distinguishing marks of a great philosopher.� I was not yet capable then, since I still lacked independent judgment, of reaching my later opinion that W. Wundt frequently erred as a positive investigator.� Another whom I counted among the most universal and important thinkers of the new era was Eugen D�hring, whose writings I have probably read in toto, who was active In political economy, mathematics, and natural science, and of whose weaknesses I was likewise not aware at that time.� That I was still woefully lacking in universality I did recognize, however. �To acquire it more fully than I had yet been able to do and to work first of all in the field of modern psychology in a scientific way was my next plan.
I therefore went for a year to Leipzig, where I found much stimulation in Wundt's Psychological Institute, in which I prepared many problems for my future research, and where, incidentally, I was inscribed as a medical student and now also studied anatomy and zo�logy.
[p. 192] Returning to Bonn for a third stay, I worked there in the Zo�logical Institute.� I also wrote my faculty habilitation thesis (Habilitationsschrift), to the contents of which I had already given much thought in Leipzig.� My two Bonn studies and the little Leipzig article, already mentioned, on the apparatus for shifting sectors (Sektorenverschiebungsapparat) were related to more comprehensive studies in the field of physiological and psychological optics. In connection with these studies and especially with my dissertation I developed my habilitation thesis, "Theorie des Talbotschen Gesetzes," which was later published in Philosophische Studien (Volume 12, pp. 279 ff.), and whose contents were again utilized later in the article, "Theorie der kinematographischen Projektionen," likewise mentioned above.� I showed that Talbot's law and all the facts connected with it can be deduced from very simple physical and mathematical considerations.
With this piece of work I entered the faculty in W�rzburg as a Privatdozent in the entire field of philosophy.� In order to enter I had to discourse upon a purely philosophical theme, the Freedom of the Will, assigned to me three days in advance, and to defend twelve theses, proposed by me, which belonged almost exclusively to philosophy proper, and which, I must admit, make a very childish impression upon me when I read them through again today.
The reasons why I chose to teach in W�rzburg were personal.� In Berlin and Leipzig I had made the acquaintance of a group of young, active psychologists and philosophers to whom I was indebted for much stimulation.� Among my fellow students in Berlin were Arthur Wreschner and William Stern, who are at present working in the Universities of Zurich and Hamburg, respectively.� Among those studying in Leipzig at that time, with many others whose acquaintance I made, were the present Professor of Pedagogics and Philosophy in Freiburg i. Br., Jonas Cohn, the present Professor of Psychology in Turin, Friedrich Kiesow, and also the Pedagogical Therapeutist, Theodor Heller of Vienna, famous today.� I also established a very stimulating relationship with Ernst Meumann, who at his death was professor in Hamburg and who, in my Leipzig period, was Wundt's second assistant.� I owed most, however, to my association with the young Privatdozent, Oswald K�lpe, who in my time was acting as first assistant in the Leipzig Institute.
K�lpe had uncanny industry and was, even then, better read than I [p. 193] have ever become. The fullness of his reading, which he was continually extending, spread not only over psychology and philosophy but also over the most varied other scientific fields.� K�lpe, with whom I ate lunch regularly in Leipzig and whom I also saw much of otherwise, both inside and outside of the Institute, was always accessible for all questions I asked and for the explanation of all problems I attacked. The appreciation which I accordingly and inevitably felt for K�lpe soon showed itself to be mutual, although I realized even then that he and I were quite different sorts of people and represented quite different types of young scholars with scientific interests.
During my third sojourn in Bonn, K�lpe had been called to W�rzburg as a regular professor (Ordinarius). �And in view of our friendly relations and of everything which I owed him it was of course natural that I should seek my field of activity in the place in which he had gained a decisive influence upon instruction and investigation. Also, in view of our relationship and the lack of another private instructor, it was quite agreeable to K�lpe that I should come to W�rzburg, especially since he was making an attempt (in which he also succeeded) to establish a psychological institute in W�rzburg and since he knew that he could be sure of my help and practical collaboration in this.
It should be clear from the details of this chapter that the practical attitude was really quite foreign to me at first.� At most, one might see certain modest beginnings of a practical point of view in the fact that I helped Martius in a practical way to build his apparatus for the investigation of reaction time to sounds�a fact which he explicitly emphasized (Martius G., Philosophische Studien, 1891, 6, 403) and in the fact that I invented in Leipzig my apparatus for shifting sectors.